Michigan Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 4

1953

TORTS-INVASION OF RIGHT OF PRIVACY BY POSTCARD
ADVERTISING
James S. Taylor
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
James S. Taylor, TORTS-INVASION OF RIGHT OF PRIVACY BY POSTCARD ADVERTISING, 51 MICH. L. REV.
613 (1953).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol51/iss4/21

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1953]

RECENT DECISIONS

613

TonTs-lNvAs10N OF RrcHT OF PRIVACY BY PosTcARD AnVERnsrnc--To

promote the sale of merchandise, defendant retail clothing store mailed a series
of postcards to prospective customers, one of which was the plaintiff. The cards,
in feminine handwriting, read, ''Please call WAbash 1943 and ask for Carolyn."
Upon reading this the plaintiff's wife, who had intercepted the card, concluded
that her husband was having a clandestine love affair with another woman, and
when the plaintiff was unable to explain "Carolyn," she left him. Subsequent
inquiry revealed that "Carolyn" was one of the defendant's employees and that
the card was an advertising stunt Plaintiff filed suit on the theory that mailing
the card to him was an invasion of his right of privacy. Defendant's demurrer
to the complaint was sustained. On appeal, held, affirmed. The contents of the
card could not reasonably be construed as having a salacious meaning and did
not constitute an invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy. Perry v. Moskins
Stores, (Ky. 1952) 249 S.W. (2d) 812.
Although the right of privacy has been judicially recognized for over fifty
years,1 only the roughest outlines of its nature and extent have as yet been
sketched by the courts. Probably the kind of tort fust contemplated was the
publicizing of some aspect of personality for commercial purpose.2 However, it

1 The first case recognizing the right of privacy as an independent right was DeMar
v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881), but it was not until after the publication
of the Warren and Brandeis article on ''The Right of Privacy," 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890) that there was ~ny widespread judicial recognition of the right.
2 See Warren and Brandeis, "The Right of Privacy," supra note I. These writers
were deeply concerned with the advent of "yellow journalism'' and its ruthless exposure
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has not been so restricted. An analysis of the authorities suggests that it has
been extended to grant protection not only against the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's private personality for commercial purpose,3 but
also to publication of his private affairs in which the public has no legitimate
interest,4 and the wrongful intrusion into his essentially private activities,11 in
such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation
to a person of ordinary sensibilities.6 These authorities indicate that while the
right of privacy bears close resemblance to the right to be free from defamation,
the fundamental bases of liability are quite different. 7 The law of defamation
is concerned with damage to reputation, with injury done to the individual in
his external relations with the community, by lowering him in the esteem of
his fellows. The effect that the publication may have upon his own feelings is
immaterial.8 On the other hand, the gist of the cause of action for violation of
one's right of privacy is the personal affront to his dignity by intrusion into his
private activities, and the destruction of his self-esteem by publication of the
truth. 9 It is not uncommon for courts to lose sight of this distinction, with a
resulting confusion in the cases. It is submitted that the court in the principal
case is correct in denying recovery based on the right of privacy, for one's selfesteem is not damaged by the publication of what he knows is false, and there
has been no intrusion into his essentially private activities. However, in reaching its decision the court reasoned that while the postcard was in bad taste the
of the intimate details of the lives of individuals with the sole purpose of increasing circulation of newspapers.
3 Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 188 Misc. 450, 65 N.Y.S. 173 (1946) (use
of story of plaintiff's life in comic books commercially distributed); Kerby v. Hal Roach
Studios, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 207, 127 P. (2d) 577 (1942) (use of plaintiff's name in
advertising a movie).
4 Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. (2d) 291 (1942) (picture of plaintiff in hospital bed with unusual disease); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., (2d Cir. 1940)
113 F. (2d) 806 (publication of the later life of a famous child prodigy). Note that while
these cases could be said to be instances of commercial appropriation of plaintiff's personality, emphasis was placed on the right to have the details of one's private life protected
against public disclosure.
5 E.g., Eavesdropping: McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92,
2 S.E. (2d) 910 (1939) (even though information obtained by eavesdropping be restricted
to the immediate transgressor, it is an invasion of privacy). Intrusions into private quarters:
DeMar v. Roberts, supra note 1 (entry of layman into delivery room during childbirth);
Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1924) (passenger aboard vessel enters
woman's stateroom at night and attempts to have sexual intercourse).
6 See generally 41 AM. Jun., Privacy 923 (1942).
7 Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., (Cal. App. 1951) 231 P. (2d) 570 (dissenting
opinion).
s Warren and Brandeis, ''The Right of Privacy," 4 HAnv. L. RBv. 193 (1890).
9 Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., (Cal. App. 1951) 231 P. (2d) 565. See also Basnett
and Thornton, ''The Truth Hurts,'' 35 VA. L. Rnv. 425 at 437 (1949). While the protection given is to one's self-esteem, the relatives of a deceased person may have an action
for the invasion of what would have been an invasion of his privacy had he lived. In such
cases it is the feelings of the relatives, not those of the deceased that are given protection.
E.g. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930) (publication of
pictures of grossly deformed deceased child of the plaintiffs).

1953]

615

RECENT DECISIONS

words appearing thereon could not reasonably be construed to have a salacious
meaning, a fact that would be controlling in an action based on defamation, but
which should have no bearing in a privacy action.10 Thus it appears that the
court unconsciously considered the requisites of libel and determined that the
words used were not defamatory. In this respect it is interesting to note the
recent decision in Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co.,11 in which the facts were
strikingly similar to those presented in the principal case and recovery was
allowed. Although the court there refused to label the tort, the rulings of law
indicate that the action was treated as one arising from the publication of a libel.
The words on the postcard were said to be capable of bearing a defamatory
meaning in that it could reasonably convey the impression of infidelity on the
part of the husband,12 it was published,13 and it caused damage to the plaintiff.14
It is submitted that this result is sound. However, even if the situation arises
in which the words used are not defamatory in nature, liability might be predicated on the theory that any willful harm, without legal justification, is actionable, regardless of whether there is a specific tort category with which to label
the action.15 This theory seems to have had some influence on the court in the
Freeman case, but there, as in the principal case, there was a specific tort category into which the wrong could fall. It is submitted that while the principal
case is correct in denying liability based on the right of privacy, its reasoning
contributes to the confusion and misunderstanding already existing as to the
fundamental nature of the right of privacy.
James

S. Taylor, S.Ed.

10 It would seem that the publication would not have to be of a salacious nature in
order to disturb the serenity of mind of a man of ordinary sensibilities. Compare Gill v.
Hearst Publishing Co., supra note 7 (requiring that the publication be "offensive'').
u Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co., (D.C. Ga. 1951), 98 F. Supp. 963. This case is
not mentioned in the opinion of the court in the principal case.
12 In libel actions it is for the court to decide whether the language used could convey
a defamatory meaning; the jury decides whether in fact it did. See PnossER, ToRTS 789
(1941).
18 The mailing of a postcard is generally held to be sufficient publication of a libel.
McKee! v. Latham, 202 N.C. 318, 162 S.E. 747 (1932); PROSSER, ToRTS 810 (1941).
14 Special damages were allowed for the loss of consortium and loss of services of
plaintiff's wife for the period of separation. It would seem that in order to recover special
damages of this nature, the plaintiff should have to show not only that the separation was
the natural and probable result of the defamation, but also that it was in fact so caused.
Cf. Rosenberg & Sons v. Craft, 182 Va. 512, 29 S.E. (2d) 375 (1944). As pointed out
in the principal case however, "it is difficult to believe that a contented wife would have
left her husband without any provocation other than the receipt by him of this postcard."
15 See, e.g., Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.
(2d) 401 (1946). While there is a conflict in the cases as to whether the law of torts
embraces this principle, or whether the only harm that is actionable is that which falls
within some accepted category of tort liability, the weight of authority supports the former
view. See 13 BROOKLYN L. REv. 219 (1947) for collection of authority.

